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Smith: High Progressive Tax Rates: Inequity and Immortality?

HIGH PROGRESSIVE TAX RATES: INEQUITY AND
IMMORALITY?
DAN THaooP SMiTH*

Any systematic discussion of progressive taxation must take as its point
of departure the 1953 monograph by Blum and Kalven, The Uneasy Case for
Progressive Taxation, which has become, in its own time, a classic example
of thorough and dispassionate analysis of the literature and issues.' Indeed
it seems unlikely that one could hope to add any major new concepts or
arguments to the theoretical framework already so well defined.
Recent studies and conjecture on various aspects of economic activity
modify somewhat the perspective from which the impact of progressive taxation must be appraised. The importance of innovation, a spirit of entrepreneurship, and administrative abilities is increasingly recognized in economies at all stages of development. It is now understood that unless people
with particular talents and points of view are active in economic enterprise,
the output from the traditional elements of production, labor, capital, and
land will fall far short of its potential. A determination of the influence of
progression and high marginal tax rates 2 on these aptitudes and on the development and application of these talents, however, is as elusive as it is
important.
Furthermore, the effects of taxation on enterprise must be appraised in
the context of the even more subtle consequences of the disenchantment of
many of the more able young college graduates with careers in the familiar
forms of productive enterprise. A substantially different allocation of talent
may evolve in ways that are presently unpredictable, with only minor influences from taxation and indeed from pecuniary incentives for those
concerned.
From year to year, we do know a bit more about the propensities to save
and consume incomes in terms of their source, their regularity, and their
direction of change, but this knowledge has not yet been worked into an
analysis of the effects of progressive taxation on the supply of capital from
individual savings. New studies and theories about corporate financial and
portfolio investment policies cast new light on the present and prospective
relative importance of individual and corporate savings, which in turn bear
*A.B. 1928, Stanford University; Ph.D. 1934, Harvard University; Sc.D. (honorary) 1962,
Iowa Wesleyan College. Professor of Finance, Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration.
1. W. BLUMi & H. KALVEN, THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION (1953). This
article has drawn frequently from the Blum & Kalven study, though detailed citations are
omitted.
2. The marginal tax rate is the rate applicable to the last increment of income. It is
to be distinguished from the average or effective rate, which is simply the quotient of the
total tax divided by the tax base and typically will not correspond to any statutory rate in
the schedule of progression. For example, the marginal rate for a single person with a
taxable income of $32,000 is 55% (applicable to the increment of income between $32,000
and $38,000), but his total tax is $12,210 giving an average or effective rate of 38.1%.
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on the significance of progressive taxation on the supply of capital. Studies
on corporate finance cover such topics as the costs of various sources of funds
and returns to the corporations from different forms of investments, dividend
distributions, and alternative ways to maximize returns to stockholders. In
addition, new theories and policies are being developed from the standpoint
of those concerned with the management of portfolios of securities for different categories of investors. 3 The results of research in the foregoing areas
modify and perhaps add precision to familiar propositions; they do not drastically alter the general framework of analysis or add major new concepts.
Recurring appraisals of progressive taxation are appropriate, however, in
light of current political and social as well as economic developments. This
article is written from that standpoint. The author has added the question
mark to the title suggested by the editors in hope of resisting the temptation
to write a diatribe against what he regards as the political excesses and demagoguery arising in the application of the concept of progressive taxation.
As a preliminary to a review of the current issues, a brief recapitulation of
the fundamental arguments will assure a minimal common background.
As on all issues of tax policy, progressivity must be appraised from the
standpoint of equity, economic effects, revenue, and administrative complications. The equity and economic issues were stated in a condensed form
by three children in a one-room school in Montana where the author had
the challenge of discussing tax policy at the invitation of his daughter, the
teacher. In response to the question: What would be a fair tax on a family
with an income of 5,000 dollars if a family with 2,000 dollars income paid
200 dollars? The first child said, "500 dollars," thereby showing a predisposition for proportional burdens and perhaps a desire to make use of a
newly-acquired familiarity with percentages. A second child immediately disagreed, with the comment that the payment should be more than 500 dollars
because "each dollar isn't so important" to the family with the larger income.
A third child agreed but with the reservation that the additional tax over
500 dollars shouldn't be "too much more or they won't work so hard."
Elaborate theoretical structures concerning diminishing utility and incentives
and disincentives are all really refinements of the quasi-intuitive opinions of
those children and may not lead to any greater certainty.
The diminishing marginal utility4 of successive units of any single product is a familiar fact and has been an integral part of economic theory for
3. For a relatively nonmathematical introduction see, e.g., R. Johnson, An Integration
of Cost of Capital Theories (The Fourth Summer Symposium of the Engineering Economy
Division of the American Society for Engineering Education) reprinted in J. WsrON & D.
WooDs, THEORY OF BUSINEss FINANCE 292-304 (1967); Bodenhorn, On the Problem of
Capital Budgeting, 14 J. FINANCE 473-92 (1959).
4. "Utility," in the economic sense, is the satisfaction derived from an economic good
or service. For most items of consumption the utility derived from successive units diminishes. The utility of the least important use, presumably that from the last in a succession of units, is the marginal utility, which in extreme cases may be negative. An orange
a month for one who likes oranges would give great satisfaction; the satisfaction from the
thirtieth orange in a month's consumption would be much less. And if one had to eat
an orange an hour, the incremental satisfaction would quickly become negative.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol20/iss4/3

2

1968]

Smith:
High Progressive Tax Rates: Inequity and Immortality?
HIGH PROGRESSIVE
TAX RATES

about a century. But extension of this concept from a single commodity to
income in general, which represents a claim on all commodities present and
future and gives a choice between consumption and savings, is questionable
in principle and quite unsatisfactory in practice if one hopes to measure the
rate of decrease in marginal utility. The concept becomes even less suitable
as a basis for public policy when one attempts to extend it to interpersonal
comparisons. Though there is probably agreement that there is some decline
in marginal utility for an individual's income, as well as for specific items
of consumption, and that a decline also exists when one considers a total
amount of income distributed among many people, there is no agreement
on or even basis for determination of the extent of decrease. Though some
progression would generally be regarded as more equitable than a proportionate tax, it is quite possible that under political pressure and confusion
about the extent of changes in tax rates as well as the absolute level of rates,
progressivity may be carried to such excesses that it is more inequitable than
proportionality.
Quite apart from uncertainty about the degree of decline in the marginal
utility of income, there is no agreement concerning whether it would be more
equitable to strive for minimum aggregate sacrifice or equal proportionate
sacrifice among taxpayers. The former sounds plausible and has in fact been
advocated by some writers, but a strict application of it would mean that taxes
would equalize incomes down to the point where the required revenue was
secured. There would be a 100 per cent tax on all incomes (or other tax
base above that point, with no tax on lesser amounts. This follows logically
from the proposition that any dollar of a larger income represents less wantsatisfying power than any dollar of a small income. Until the largest income
is brought down to the level of the next largest income, any taxation of the
next largest involves greater sacrifice than additional taxation of the remaining balance of the largest. 5
The idea of equalization of net incomes through taxation to the point
where adequate revenue is secured is for many a valid reductio ad absurdum
of the whole idea of progression. If one contemplates a so-called negative
income tax at the bottom end of the scale, taxation under this concept would
5. In a simplified example, if an income distribution consisted of one income of

$150,000, two of $100,000 each, ten of $50,000 each, and eighty-seven of $20,000 each, and
only $50,000 revenue was required, it should all come from the income of $150,000 under
the theory of minimum aggregate sacrifice, since even the 50,000th dollar from it presumably
represents less satisfaction than any one of the dollars of the person with an income of
$100,000. If total revenue requirements do not exceed $200,000, all revenue should come
from the three incomes above $50,000 and reduce them to that level. Only if total
revenue required exceeded $590,000 would there be any tax on incomes of $20,000; equalization down to that level would produce $590,000. If $690,000 were required, incomes would

be equalized down to $19,000. Alternatively, one might try to attain equal marginal sacrifice,
recognizing that a small payment by someone with the smaller income may represent no
more relative sacrifice than some part of the large payment by the person with the larger
income. In the example above, a $10,000 tax on the incomes of $100,000 might involve
the same relative sacrifice as a $30,000 tax on an income of $150,000, to produce $50,000 of
revenue. But marginal utilities and sacrifices are elusive, if not nebulous.
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become a device for complete equalization of after-tax net incomes. Even
the most ardent equalizers, or the most rigorous logicians, usually stop short
of 100 per cent marginal tax rates, if only on pragmatic grounds.
The alternative standard of equal proportional sacrifice throws one back
to the confusion about the rate of decrease in marginal utility. No basis for
psychological measure has yet been found to remove the uncertainty that
impelled McCulloch to make his much quoted statement about progression
almost a century and a quarter ago that "the moment you abandon . . . the

cardinal principle of exacting from all individuals the same proportion of
their income or their property, you are at sea without rudder or compass, and
6
there is no amount of injustice or folly you may not commit."

A precise analysis in terms of equity is made even more difficult by the
need to relate tax burdens to benefits from government services. Though
taxation is the means to pay for government services, which, hopefully, are
confined to the activities providing general benefit which can only, or most
effectively, be provided collectively, government services in fact give direct
benefits in varying degrees to individuals. In many respects the services are
intended to help those who can least afford to help themselves and hence any
attempt to match taxes against benefits would contravene the very purpose
of the government program. But enough of the services are quasi-commercial,
or yield benefits that do not have to involve a redistribution of income to be
effective, to make a comparison of taxes to benefits not wholly irrelevant.
Though theoretically valid, an attempt to carve out and value a segment of
individual benefits from the body of general benefits is as frustrating as an
attempt to establish the shape of a curve representing the declining utility
of income. The existence of this two-fold problem further weakens any confidence one might have in any scientific establishment of equity in a tax
system.
Quite apart from equity, one may argue that progressive taxation is
justified by the need to reduce inequality and thereby establish a more attractive society (some refer to a more aesthetically satisfying society), the need to
reduce social and political tensions, and the need to create greater equality
of opportunity. All these are valid and appealing objectives, but some are
purely subjective, and the role of taxation in others is quite indeterminate.
They cannot, however, be brushed aside as irrelevant. Blum and Kalven
conclude that an extensive analysis simply:7
[S]uggests the tantalizing combination of plausible, ingenious and improbable ideas which make up the case for progression in terms of
sacrifice and ability to pay. It likewise suggests why these notions have
such a stubborn appeal. But it tends to demonstrate that the hold of
these notions on the general public must derive from the fallacies that
have frequented the theories and not from their truths which are
difficult to drive to and once found would not support any firm conviction about the validity of the progressive principle.

6. J. McCULLOCH, TAXATION AND THE FUNDING
7. W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, supra note 1 at 68.
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When one turns to the economic significance of progression, the analysis
must be made from several standpoints, only two of which are simple and
straightforward. The revenue from a progressive income tax invariably
fluctuates more with changes in national income than does a proportional
tax. It thus exerts a counter-cyclical effect and is referred to as an automatic
stabilizer.8 On this point, the facts and conclusions seem incontrovertible,
though opinions differ on their importance. Many other counter-cyclical
forces are available, including timely changes in tax rates and structures by
legislation.
A second fairly certain economic result of progression in taxation is that
it favors consumption over saving because of a somewhat higher marginal
propensity to save from larger and from increasing incomes. In the 1930's
with the prevalence of the fallacy of the mature economy and the presumption
that savings would always outrun investment opportunities, progressive
taxation was regarded as especially suitable to reduce those incomes that
were most likely to be saved. With the more recent emphasis on the need for
investment to increase productivity and minimize the inflationary effects of
large annual increases in wage rates, a tax factor that discriminates against
potential savings is more likely to be regarded as undesirable. From this
standpoint, the very high degree of progression seems particularly unfortunate when it exists in some of the underdeveloped countries that so desperately need both capital and enterprise even to maintain their present low
per capita incomes.
The effects of progression on incentives for work and investment are more
important and less clear than the effects on fluctuations in revenue and on the
availability of net incomes most likely to be saved. Extreme critics are disposed to say that high progression will so destroy incentives that an economic
system will grind to a halt. This is manifestly absurd, but the fact of continued growth in countries with high marginal tax rates is no reason to
ignore their possible adverse influence on the amount and direction of human
effort and investment. With a better tax structure, the growth might be
greater.
Personal activity is stimulated by many incentives, among which pecuniary
reward is only one. The old presumption of the "economic man," concerned
only with maximizing the material gains from his efforts, has long been
superseded. An entire field of study has been developed around human
behavior in large and small organizations, with much of the analysis devoted
to the nonpecuniary satisfactions and dissatisfactions in job situations. 9 Per8. In economic terms, a "counter-cyclical factor" is one that operates in the opposite
direction from the familiar cyclical forces. An increase in welfare payments during a recession is counter-cyclical to the decrease in private income from employment and investment. An automatic stabilizer is one that arises without the need for new legislation or
administrative action. Progressivity in income taxation has an automatic stabilizing effect
in that revenues fall off more sharply than total personal income in a recession because it
is the highest segments of income that are subject to the highest tax rates; government expenditures are thus likely to be covered by deficit financing, which in turn is likely to have
an expansionary effect.
9. See E. MAYO & F. ROErHLISBERGER, MANAGEMENT AND THE WORKER (1939); A. TURNER
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haps surprisingly, more attention has been given to people employed in
routine work than to those in higher levels of management and entrepreneurship. It is the latter who have the greater opportunities for such nonpecuniary rewards as power, prestige, and the satisfaction of one's various
desires and talents for creative and socially constructive activity and whose
motivations therefore are presumably the more complex.1° But it is now so
clear that material rewards are by no means so dominant that any analysis of
the effects of taxation which is based on the assumption that it operates on
a simple "economic man" is woefully inadequate. Since taxation operates
primarily to modify the pecuniary rewards of work, the effects of taxation
should be appraised with full appreciation of the fact that pecuniary rewards
are not necessarily dominant. Subject to this broad and important reservation, the direction of the effects of progressive taxation are quite clear.
By progressively reducing the net return from any given increment of
gross income or gain, progressive taxation discourages additional efforts or
activities, or a change in the direction of efforts or activities, which might be
prompted by greater material rewards. It is always important to note the
marginal rate of tax. Too often, defenders of the existing pattern of progression brush aside criticism by noting that the average rate of tax is lower
than the marginal rate. This is, of course, true by definition. The average
rate gives a quick indication of the fractions of a total income taken by
taxation and left for consumption or saving. But it gives virtually no indication about the effects of taxation on incentives.
A moment's reflection will indicate the difference, for example, of the
effects on incentives if one compares two people each with taxable income of
20,000 dollars and each subject to an average tax rate of 50 per cent. In
one case the tax is a flat 50 per cent; in the other the tax is 20 per cent on
the first 10,000 dollars and 80 per cent on the second 10,000 dollars. They
each pay a total tax of 10,000 dollars and have a net income of 10,000 dollars,
but the first man can keep 50 cents of each extra dollar earned while the
second man can keep only 20 cents on each dollar. In virtually all respects
regarding incentives, it is the marginal rate of tax on increments of income
that is significant.
On a transitory basis, an increase in taxation, through greater progression
or a general increase in rates, may stimulate greater effort to maintain an
existing standard of living. Two people may react quite differently to a tax
structure depending, among other things, on their status under an earlier tax
structure. The standards of living of executives and professional people with
similar incomes differ on the basis of the scale of expenditure to which they
became accustomed under lower taxes. With the persistence of high tax
rates since the 1930's, the comparisons are probably not so conspicuous or
numerous now as they were shortly after the rates were first raised, but in the
late 1940's the standards of living of executives with comparable incomes in
the same organization often differed not only with individual tastes but
& P. LAWRENCE, INDUSTRIAL JOBS AND THE WORKER

10. For a recent inquiry into this field, see A.
SHIP (1966).
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because the older ones reduced savings and even drew on capital to maintain
a level to which they had become accustomed while the younger ones continued to save as their incomes rose and simply aspired to less consumption
from a given gross income.
The possibility of extra income for extra effort varies greatly with the
line of activity. An executive does not have the chance for increments of
income from overtime or secondary employment. Even independent professional men may have commitments to established clients or patients that
require full-time availability and hence activity. But the author recalls having
heard, at the end of World War I, the phrase "income-tax golfer" used to
describe those who opted for more recreation in preference to full activity in
business or professional work. And it is not uncommon for even academic
people to remark in casual conversations that they have declined an invitation
to speak or prepare a paper because the honorarium was so reduced by income
taxation. It would be interesting and useful to know whether it is the reduced absolute level of the net honorarium or the fact that a major fraction
of a given amount had to be paid in taxes that was the principal disincentive.
For most people, both aspects probably have some importance.
Though an individual income tax theoretically is not shifted forward, it
seems likely that in fact very high salaries and fees are somewhat higher than
they would be if marginal tax rates did not exceed 35 or 40 per cent. There
is no solid basis for comparing productivity against payment fees for those
whose unique talents, or unique good fortune, put them in positions to make
decisions with far-reaching pecuniary implications. With salary and bonus
figures required to be made public in widely owned companies, public acceptability is certainly one of the criteria determining salaries. The fact
that proxy statements, on which compensation is shown for key executives,
almost always show presumed income taxes and net incomes in succeeding
columns for individually named executives at least suggests that the gross
payments may be larger because the net results are so drastically reduced by
taxation.
Investments, in contrast to personal activity, do not typically yield nonpecuniary rewards that offset or compensate for lack of material gain. To be
sure, ownership of land may provide prestige and emotional satisfaction, as
well as an inflation hedge. And certain industries or types of companies may
be regarded so distastefully that investments in them, whether directly or by
purchase of listed securities, is avoided by many investors regardless of possible
rates of return. There is, however, no universal standard of what is unacceptable, and both the degree and direction of fastidiousness depends on
the individual concerned. But in spite of these disincentives for certain
types of investments, there is no general nonpecuniary pressure for capital
to become active. Idle capital does not get bored or develop a sense of
frustration because of its wasted talents. In brief, investment is much more
susceptible to purely pecuniary calculations and hence to tax influences than
personal activity.
The higher the marginal tax rate the greater the inducement to move
away from investments that yield regular taxable income toward either tax-
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exempt bonds or equity investments that have prospects for capital appreciation. The supply of tax-exempt bonds is so large that it exceeds the demand
by high-bracket investors and for many years the yield has had to be high
enough to attract medium-bracket investors, with a resulting large tax advantage to the intra-marginal holders. (With top-grade municipals selling
to yield about 70 per cent of that on AAA corporate bond yields, the two
types give an equivalent yield for an investor subject to a 30 per cent marginal tax, assuming that the securities are equally attractive except for the
different tax status. But an investor taxed at a 70 per cent marginal rate
would secure a net income 2.33 times higher than that on taxable bonds.)
The reduction in the top bracket rate from 91 to 70 per cent between 1964
and 1966 had little effect on the yield differential.
The lower rate of tax on capital gains, with a ceiling of 25 per cent, is
criticized by some as unfair in that it breaks the uniform application of the
progressive rate structure. Others, including the author, argue with equal
emphasis that any tax on long-term gains which are reinvested is more in
the nature of a capital levy on the act of shifting from one capital asset to
another than an income tax. A discussion of this issue carries one into the
definition of taxable income and the distinction between the net accretion
concept and the traditional dichotomy of capital and income. (It must be
admitted regretfully that the tendency of some investors to treat part of the
long-term appreciation in capital values as disposable income weakens the
validity of the distinction.) But discussion of the concept of taxable income
would go far beyond the proper limits of this article concerned with progression in the rate structures.
The fact of the lower tax on capital gains profoundly influences both the
direction and the total amount of investment. The reason for the effect on
the direction of investment is self-evident. The higher the spread between
the marginal rate on income and the capital gains rate, the greater the influence in favor of the capital gains. The effect on total investment is less
obvious, but it arises from the fact that taxation at full rates would require
liquidation of more capital to pay the tax when investment is shifted from
one asset to another. Also, if the rates are very high, it might force some
capital funds into idleness because net yields would be inadequate to
compensate for the risk and effort of investment.
The greater attraction of capital gains would appear to increase the
supply of funds for equity-type and higher-risk investments which, in turn,
permits the financing of innovation and new ventures. From this standpoint, the shift in direction of investment because of high marginal rates on
regular income may actually foster economic development, so long as the
capital gains rate is not unduly repressive. But against the favorable influence on the direction of investment must be set the unfavorable impact on
the supply of savings. Thus, though the direction of investment may be improved, the total amount of investment may be reduced, with the net effect
indeterminate. With a somewhat higher marginal propensity to save from
higher and growing incomes, progressive taxation hits disproportionately the
segments of income most likely to be saved.
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Each country has its own set of tax-sheltered investments, depending on
the details of its tax laws. Real estate investments receive especially favorable
treatment in this country, as do many aspects of agriculture. Tax-exempt
mergers are favored over taxable sales of companies to new owners who would
continue them as independent entities. Particular forms of capital structures
are encouraged and others discouraged, especially in closely controlled corporations. Even a company with no growth can be made attractive if an older
generation in a family takes senior securities that are retired with retained
earnings, thereby increasing the value of a highly-leveraged common stock
held by a younger generation.
Religious institutions, by an unjustified exemption from the tax on unrelated business income applicable to other tax-exempt organizations, are
put in a position to pay higher prices than other potential purchasers of
business concerns and to do so in a manner that is least likely to build up
the enterprise after purchase. Cooperatives are favored over fully-taxable
businesses. Extractive industries receive differential tax treatment with consequent lower prices to consumers or higher returns to investors. The list
could be extended almost indefinitely. Some of the differential effects are
intended and others arise from general provisions of the law. But they are
all made more significant by high and progressive tax rates.
Among the economic effects of high and progressive rates, one must include the diversion of intelligence and effort into attempts to minimize
taxes. Whenever a tax rate exceeds 50 per cent, it becomes more important
to save a dollar of taxes than to earn a dollar of income, and this fact
cannot fail to divert attention from truly productive activities. Though the
incomes of those concerned with tax minimization enter the gross national
product as fully as do those of all other producers of goods and services, their
contribution to the general welfare seems at best ambiguous.
Progression typically contributes a very minor fraction of total revenue.
When government expenditures amounted to 10 per cent of the gross national
product or less, it would have been possible to construct a tax system that
would have received most of the revenue from the higher brackets in a generally low-rate tax structure. But when expenditures absorb 25 or 30 per
cent of the gross national product, the bulk of the revenue must come from
the great mass of taxpayers. The higher income rates contribute only a very
minor fraction of the total yield; rates above 50 per cent typically contribute no more than 2 per cent of the total and the entire structure of rates
above the base rate, if the latter were applied to the first 2,000 dollars of
taxable income, typically contributes less than 20 per cent of the total. One
can say categorically that progression, with all its distorting effects, is not
required to provide adequate revenue. It must be justified on other grounds.
Nor can progressive rates be said to facilitate tax administration, either
for tax collectors or taxpayers. The result is quite dearly the contrary. Not
only do differences in rates complicate calculations, they make impossible a
really effective system of withholding and, by encouraging shifts to taxsheltered activities and investments, require loophole-closing amendments
to the laws, which further complicate it. Or conversely, Congress is moved
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to adopt special relief provisions because the full burden of high-bracket rates
is recognized as intolerable for certain types of incomes, and the special
relief provisions are likely to be as complicated as those that close loopholes;
in fact, adoption of a relief provision is likely to be followed by or itself
be complicated by the need to prevent abuse of it. Progressive rates clearly and
markedly complicate the tax law and its administration.
The existence of personal exemptions in the individual income tax provides a very real form of progression in average effective rates toward the
bottom of the income scale since those whose incomes are just above the
exemption pay only a very small tax. Progression from this source is quite
pronounced until the taxable income is several times the personal exemption.
And this sort of progression does simplify tax administration by making unnecessary the filing of many returns. One thus must distinguish between progression that arises automatically from the existence of a basic exemption
and progression arising from a progressive rate structure. The former, a sort
of built-in progression, is usually simplifying; the latter is almost inevitably
complicating.
Probably the most serious burden that high progressive rates place on the
tax administration comes from the strain on taxpayer morale. Our whole
system relies heavily on self-assessment and tax evasion is generally still regarded as socially reprehensible in our country. But when marginal tax rates
are made quasi-confiscatory for long periods, as distinct from short periods of
war or other national emergency, tax evasion may come to be condoned by
both the private and public conscience. And once a part of a tax is flouted
with impunity, the rest of the tax system is in peril - as some critics of the
progressive tax on foreign travel expense proposed in the winter of 1968 so
properly emphasized.
Rates in excess of 50 per cent should be eliminated if for no other reason
than because of the strain they place on the morale of taxpayers subject to
them and the consequent jeopardy to our whole system of self-assessed income taxes. Senator Russell Long's proposal for an optional maximum rate
of 50 per cent for those taxpayers who include in their tax base various forms
of tax-exempt income and waive their claims for various deductions is one
of the most constructive proposals for reform of the past generation."" Its
adoption would ease the strain of excessive rates, greatly simplify tax calculations and administration, and remove the worst of the distorting effects of
high tax rates on incentives and investment. In brief, it would go a long
way to create a world in which people would get on with the world's work
instead of diverting their ingenuity to tax shenanigans. Indeed, a reduction
of rates to 50 per cent might well increase total revenues as savings increase
and investment and activity take place with less tax-induced distortion.
Two exceptions should be made, however, in the scope of the Long
proposal. True long-term capital gains should be given differential treatment as is now done, at least for those gains that are reinvested. This is
necessary to prevent a major tax barrier to equity-type investment. And chari11.
8363).

21 CONGRESSIONAL Q. WEEKLY REP. 2253
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table deductions should be continued to permit the financing of the existing
diversity of institutions in educational and welfare activities. Government
monopoly in these areas should be more acceptable than private monopoly
in business.
As one appraises the present status of progressivity in tax rates, the
principal problems seem to arise from what may be referred to as the "each
and every" fallacy. Progression has been so vociferously advocated and so
indiscriminately accepted that it has become a virtual fetish in political life,
with two unfortunate results. There is, first, a presumption that each and
every tax should be in and of itself progressive. Sales and property taxes are
criticized and at times rejected because they are not progressive. Surely it
is the distribution of the local tax burden that must be judged in the light
of equity and consistency with social policy. It seems as ridiculous to insist
that every tax be progressive as it would be to insist that everything in a
meal be salted because salt is a necessary item in a diet. The result of the
obsession about progression is a very real political difficulty in developing a
balanced tax structure.
Total revenue requirements are so large that no one tax, not even a
"least bad" income tax, should be relied on as a sole or even dominant
source of funds. With a combination of taxes, rates on each one can be kept
from becoming excessive, and the inevitable defects of each may hopefully
balance out the defects of the others. The rates of those taxes most suitable
for progression can be set to give whatever degree of progression is deemed appropriate in the composite burden.
The author favors a maximum marginal income tax rate of 50 per cent
on grounds of equity and social policy. This rate also seems to have merit
on economic grounds for reasons already enumerated. A limitation to this
figure in no sense suggests approval of all aspects of conspicuous consumption
by the very rich, which after all may seem no more foolish or offensive than
the forms of conspicuous consumption of those with modest or even small
incomes. But taste in consumption is an individual matter, and the income
tax is both an inefficient and an inappropriate device for regulation.
When there is a happy coincidence of large potential revenue and a consensus on the need for regulation, selective excises may be used advantageously, as has been done in the liquor and tobacco taxes. But it is
doubtful whether the tax system should be regarded as a principal instrument for solving social problems. Fines and penalties directly imposed are
preferable to special taxes and tax credits in the control of pollution of the
environment, whether it occurs by chemicals in the air and water or by billboards and junk yards on the ground. An attempt to find ways to modify
tax systems to make them help at least in a small way in dealing with the
population explosion - the greatest social problem of all - without adding to
the individual problems of the disadvantaged, should be regarded by tax
theorists and technicians as a major challenge. Though the tax law may be of
relatively small importance in dealing with this problem, it is so urgent that
specialists in any area that might bear on it should devote some thought to
the subject.
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The second manifestation of the "each and every" fallacy appears when
tax rates are changed. Very high marginal rates have developed because of
confusion over the form of a tax increase. In 1932, when the range of rates
was from 1.5 to 25 per cent, the bottom rate was raised to 4 per cent to
secure more revenue. The percentage increase in the rate was applied to
the top rate, pushing it to 63 per cent, an increase that from one point of view
might be considered merely proportionate. But in terms of the impact on
net income it was almost fantastically progressive. At the bottom, net
income was reduced from 98.5 cents to 96 cents, or by a little over 2.5 per
cent, while at the top it was reduced from 75 cents to 37 cents or by more
than half. A continued application of this "proportionate" form of tax
increase would have pushed the top rate to 315 per cent when the bottom
rate rose to 20 per cent.
In fact, even an increase of an equal number of percentage points is
highly progressive when added to an existing progressive rate structure. One
percentage point added to a 14 per cent rate reduces net income from 86 to
85 or by 1.16+ per cent, while the same one percentage point addition to a
70 per cent rate reduces the net income from 30 to 29 or by 3.33 per cent.
The proposal to increase tax liabilities by a uniform percentage has the
effect of greatly increasing the progressivity of the tax system. A 10 per cent
increase in liabilities would push the bottom rate from 14 to 15.4 per cent
and the top rate from 70 to 77 per cent. A 40 per cent increase in liabilities
would leave the bottom rate at 19.6 per cent, below the 20 per cent level at
which it recently stood, while pushing the top rate to 98 per centl
Such a result should not be regarded as an improbable fantasy. The
recent increase in tax liabilities on British incomes pushed marginal rates
to approximately 100 per cent. The ill-fated proposed 5 per cent increase in
liabilities in Canada in early 1968 wisely included a dollar ceiling of 600
dollars to prevent excessive increase in the marginal impact on the highest
brackets.
On reductions of rates the reverse analysis can be applied. A reduction
from 90 to 70 per cent increases marginal net income three-fold while a complete abolition of a bottom rate of 20 per cent could no more than increase
income by 25 per cent. To a considerable extent, the very high marginal tax
rates have arisen from confusion about the arithmetic and definitions regarding equal, proportionate, and progressive changes in rates when the
changes are made in a rate structure that is already highly progressive. Protagonists of each position make the calculations to fit their program, but the
fetish of progressivity too often obliterates reasoned analysis and comparisons.
Progressivity in income and inheritance taxation, though universally
adopted and almost universally supported in theoretical literature, lacks a
solid base for a rational determination of the appropriate degree of progression. A succession of standards has been advanced in attempts to give
precision to the concept of ability to pay, which is generally presumed to
support progressive taxation. But none of these standards has received general
acceptance even by those who intuitively favor progression on grounds of
equity and support it as a matter of social policy. The economic effects of
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progression are more likely to be harmful than beneficial. Its revenue importance is negligible. It complicates tax administration and, when pushed
to excess, strains taxpayer morale.
Some element of progression appeals to an almost intuitive sense of fair.
ness, which is widely held. It is also consistent with a social policy of preventing indefinitely large accumulations of wealth. But progression as it
exists is the result of the play of political forces in an area that has lacked
clear definitions and analysis. In its excesses it may indeed approach inequity
and immorality.
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